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Abstract
Based on a presentation at The Undivided Mind conference at Plymouth University, this 
article sketches out speculative applications of  somatics, the first person, 
phenomenological study of  sensation, perception and movement. I first introduce the 
subject of  somatics through an experiential exercise for the reader before summarizing 
theoretical aspects of  somatic study. Drawing from the literature in embodied cognition 
and from personal recollections of  embodied experiences, I propose how somatic 
approaches could potentially be used in working with immigrant communities, living in 
outer space, and empathizing with non-human animals.
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This article sketches speculative applications of  somatics, the first person, 
phenomenological study of  sensation, perception and movement. A primary goal of  
somatic learning processes is to bring aspects of  prenoetic, affective experience into 
consciousness.1 Since somatics is primarily experiential, it is best to introduce this article 
by asking you, the reader, to participate in an exercise that I now detail in a set of  
instructions. To get started, find someone who can read out – over the span of  5 to 10 
minutes – the following to you: 2
 Start by making yourself  more comfortable in the current position you are in. If  
you are sitting, for instance, sit as comfortably as you can. 
 Close your eyes. Turn your attention towards yourself.
 Are you aware of  your breathing? Which parts of  your torso are moving when 
you inhale? Which parts are moving when you exhale? Don’t try to change 
anything, just lightly direct your attention to your breathing. Throughout this 
exercise, try simply to observe yourself  and resist the temptation to change or 
‘fix’ anything about yourself.
 Notice how your weight is being supported by the chair, table, ground or 
whatever surfaces you are in contact with. Which parts of  you are in contact with
these surfaces? If  the parts of  yourself  that are in contact with these surfaces – 
for instance, the back of  your thighs, your calves, your back – were smeared with 
ink, can you imagine the sizes and the shapes of  the ink blots that you would be 
making on the surfaces? 
 Notice the space between the lower tip of  your ear and the top of  your shoulder. 
How far apart are your ears from your shoulders? Is the distance between your 
right ear and right shoulder the same distance as that between your left ear and 
left shoulder? 
 Notice where your shoulders are relative to your pelvis. Are you leaning forward, 
or backward? Is your torso balanced on top of  your pelvis? 
 Notice your fingers. Are they curved inwards towards your palm, or are they 
extended out flat? Are the fingers of  one hand more curved than the other? 
 Now open your eyes and bring your attention back to the room. 
 Notice if  you feel any differences in the way the chair, floor, or table feels to you 
compared to when you began the exercise. If  there is another person in the room
with you, notice if  anything has changed in the way you feel or think about them.
Notice any other differences in what you can sense and feel compared to when 
you began this exercise.
 Notice if  you still feel comfortable in your current position. Would you arrange 
yourself  differently in your current position so that you can feel more 
comfortable? If  so, do it now.
The soma
The exercise that I hope you have just experienced was intended to develop your soma – 
‘the living, self-sensing, internalized perception of  oneself ’ (Hanna 1988: 20). The soma 
is contrasted against the externalized, objective, third-person perspective of  a body. 
Because every individual both has a body and is a body (Shusterman 2008: 21), the soma 
is simultaneously creator, tool, material, product and witness. Somatics is the study of  the
soma, which places particular emphases on sensation, perception and motor action, and 
always in the context of  the self-sensing self. 3 It does so by training the interoceptive, 
proprioceptive and kinaesthetic senses (Smyth 2012; Hanna 1988; Schiphorst 2008). 
Interoception is the ‘sense of  the physiological condition of  the body’ with respect to 
homeostasis (Craig 2003). Proprioception refers to the sense of  ‘limb position and 
movement, the sense of  tension or force, the sense of  effort, and the sense of  balance’; 
kinaesthesia is a related construct that refers more specifically the sense of  movement 
(Proske and Gandevia 2012). 
Somatics has many related and subsidiary fields, techniques and approaches, and is 
closely related to other sets of  practices, such as modern and contemporary dance, 
Eastern meditative traditions, and martial arts (Schiphorst 2008). Somatic practices are 
generally ameliorative, aiming to heighten awareness of  the body – ‘somatic 
connoisseurship’ (Schiphorst 2011) – in order to improve the ‘use of  the self ’ (Gelb 
1990; Shusterman 2008: 8). This is achieved by turning attention inward and using 
movement as a way to study sensation and perception. 
Three speculative applications of  somatics
Somatic theories, practices and skills have been extended to and applied in a wide variety 
of  fields, from psychotherapy (Nolan 2014) to the design of  new computing 
technologies (Höök et al. 2015; Lee et al. 2014; Levisohn 2011; Schiphorst 2008). It can 
also lead to insights in other design disciplines such as urban planning and architecture 
(see for instance Biggs 2015). In this article, I sketch out further, speculative applications 
of  somatics. Detailed exploration and discussion of  each scenario is deferred for the 
future; my aim in this article is to lay out the foundational arguments for why these 
scenarios plausibly warrant applications of  somatic approaches. My approach builds on 
Gallagher’s (2011) distinction between the body schema (which resides in the cognitive 
unconscious and is prenoetic) and the body image (which is accessible to awareness and 
conscious processing). I propose that somatics leverages the plasticity of  the nervous 
system to facilitate the transformation of  the body schema, and it does so by making 
perceptible differentiations in the motor activity and functional organization of  the body 
image (Doidge 2015). 
Immigrant somatics 
Somatics has been criticized, as Rouhiainen writes, ‘for invoking a self-centeredness and 
for not offering the means of  applying the knowledge retrieved from the body to 
everyday life and social interaction’ (2008). In response, researchers in the field have 
defending the value of  somatics in informing social movements, particularly gender and 
body politics in the West (Curtis 2015; Green 2003). Yet it remains a compelling 
challenge to somatics. While somatic practices often emphasize the uniqueness of  
experience, and how embodied experience can differ radically from one person to 
another, contemporary choreographer and somatics researcher Isabelle Ginot argues that
there is an implicit corporeal ontology embedded in many somatic practices and research:
Somatic discourses are mobilized by thoughts of  the universal. They are 
freighted with innumerable ideologies: the natural…, the transcendent …, 
the biological difference of  the sexes, and cultural hierarchies. … Behind the 
insistence on the singularity of  each corporeality, most somatic methods 
have as a backdrop a homogenous, universal, ahistorical, and occidental 
body… Is the somatic body so universal that it transcends this issue? 
Thought to respond to culturally and historically determined ills, somatics 
has not conceptualized the social changes that accompanied its development;
instead, it has remained fixated on the concepts of  body and culture current 
at the time of  its advent. How can somatics respond to the needs of  a non-
Western public, in a time of  globalization and massive immigration?... Can 
somatics help us understand the unique corporality of  migrant peoples and 
contribute to reducing their suffering? In other words, what would somatic 
knowledge look like when applied to issues of  postcolonialism? (2010)
Positionality (England 1994) is relevant here: I am a non-white immigrant to Anglo-
American geography and culture, having migrated on my own from the Philippines to 
the West Coast of  Canada in the mid-1990s while I was in my late teens. I encountered 
somatic practices in my mid-20s in the course of  studying contemporary dance. My 
narrative is, admittedly, markedly different from those of  immigrants fleeing war-torn 
countries. Nevertheless, I suggest that there is still value in foregrounding my subjective 
experience through autobiographical narrative. Building on this, I offer a tentative, 
speculative response to Ginot’s questions in the form of  three potential approaches for 
how somatics might possibly be applied to immigrant contexts. It relies on embodied 
ontologies that presuppose precisely the kind of  homogenous and ahistoric body that 
Ginot cautions against; however, these ontologies made sense from both within my own 
embodied day-to-day experiences, as well as during experience of  exploring heightened 
sensation and awareness through movement in a studio. Moreover, these assertions are 
consonant with arguments from the embodied cognition perspective within the cognitive
sciences (Wilson 2002).4
Weber-Fechner law and bodies under stress
The Weber-Fechner Law (Hargrove 2010; Latash 2008; Smyth 2012) is a psychophysical 
principle that describes the relationship between the perceptibility of  a change in 
stimulus. If  the initial stimulus is low, then a small change (call it d) in the stimulus level 
will be detected; if  the initial stimulus is high, then a change by the same amount d will 
not be as perceptible. This principle applies to the observation of  sensory-motor action; 
it is easier to discern to sense changes in structure and function during movement if  the 
movement is small and gentle, creating what is known in the somatic practice of  the 
Feldenkrais Method® as a differentiation (Feldenkrais 2005). Cortical representations of  
body parts correspond to how intensely, complexly and finely differentiated those body 
parts are used (Doidge 2015; Elbert et al. 1995). Hence, deliberate application of  the 
Weber-Fechner law to sensory-motor action (through gentle and slow motion) facilitates 
increased and more finely differentiated use of  those body parts and correspondingly 
changes cortical representations of  those parts in the brain.
In high stress situations, the flight-or-fight response is activated, resulting in an increase 
in muscle tone. I suggest that the ability to make kinaesthetic differentiations is reduced 
during stressful periods. Moreover, following the Weber-Fechner Law, the amount of  
change in one’s posture or movements must increase in magnitude in order for 
proprioceptive and kinaesthetic sensory information to be perceptible. I suggest that 
individuals who report the feeling of  tension in specific areas in their bodies are less able 
to make kinaesthetic and proprioceptive distinctions in those areas. If  there is widespread
increase in muscle tonus for an individual, due for instance to constant and high-intensity
stress, then strategies for facilitating somatic knowledge must be planned accordingly, as 
the individual may not be able to sense very small changes as when tonus is less and 
muscles are closer to their resting state.  I suggest that while this is true for most people 
regardless of  their place of  origin, this is worth bearing in mind when working with non-
western publics, and particularly with immigrant communities for whom the process of  
relocation can be traumatic.
Embodying self-confidence
As an immigrant to a new country, I found the ability to feel secure and confident within 
an unfamiliar culture a critical skill to develop. Somatics has played a hand in this. As part
of  my training as a dancer, I studied a variety of  embodied practices, including yoga, 
Pilates, the Feldenkrais Method® (Feldenkrais 1990), the Alexander Technique (Gelb 
1990), Laban Movement Analysis (Davies 2001; Laban 1974; Lamb et al. 2011; McCaw 
and Laban 2011), and the Franklin Method® (Franklin 1996), either as part of  a formally
taught curriculum or through self-study. It was my study of  these practices that led to me
to certain discoveries, which came as anatomically based Eureka moments. For instance, 
while walking down the street and practicing ‘actively pushing against the ground from 
the balls my feet’, I realized that this allowed the front of  my pelvis to ‘open’ and my hip 
flexors to lengthen. The back of  my legs – my calves, hamstrings and my gluteal muscles 
– also participated more actively in the movement. I could more clearly feel the heft of  
my pelvis. My stride became longer and I remember clearly registering shock when I 
realized what I was doing. I was swaggering. Or perhaps more accurately, I was walking 
the walk of  someone who knew exactly what they wanted and was making a beeline 
towards it with unstoppable determination. 
A similarly powerful experience happened in the middle of  a Pilates class. I discovered 
the muscles that pull my shoulder blades down (‘scapular depression’) and I could feel a 
concomitant expansion across my collarbone and an upward lengthening of  my head, 
neck and thorax. And I remember suddenly feeling – for what seemed like the first time 
in my life – utterly powerful. It was both a vulnerable and an empowering sensation, and 
it was nothing short of  a revelation.
It is worth noting that my experiences resonate with studies in experimental psychology, 
which have suggested a relationship between actively adopting a body posture and 
feelings of  self-confidence and positive mood (Briñol et al. 2011; Zabetipour et al.  
2015). Posture has also been found to mediate the content of  existing thoughts (Halper 
2012), in a process that Briñol and colleagues (2012) have called ‘embodied validation’. 
Another way in which I have developed self-confidence as an immigrant was to 
understand that people moved differently in my host culture, and that I had choices on 
how I could mobilize my physical self  either to fit into my host culture with or 
differentiate myself. I suggest that individuals within a sociocultural group might share 
not only gestural preferences (Moore and Yamamoto 2012), but also habitual patterns of
muscular tonus and other non-gestural movement behaviour that is influenced by 
similarities in their body schema and body image. If  groups and entire societies can share
a common language distinguished by variations in dialects and accents, as well as share 
common sensitivities to spoken phonemes, it is not unreasonable to propose that groups 
and entire societies can also share common sensory-motor patterns: similar ways of  
walking, sitting and generally mobilizing the physical self  in relationship to the world. 
The ability to make fine discriminations in movement habits – through observing others 
and one’s self  – might lead to the ability for immigrant communities to form strategies 
for physically relating with their host culture. These strategies might include not just 
cultural ‘integration’ but also opposition and counterpoint.
Microgravity somatics 
Proprioceptive, vestibular and exteroceptive sensory information are integrated in order 
to allow humans to shape themselves into functional postures and to navigate through 
the environment (Feldenkrais 2005; Imai et al. 2001; Latash 2008; McNeill  et al. 2010). 
In microgravity environments such as in outer space, however, the absence of  gravity 
presents major challenges to locomotion and spatial orientation. There is evidence to 
suggest that the proprioceptive system eventually adapts to these conditions, but slowly 
(Roll et al. 1998). Research is underway on how to intervene in these situations. For 
instance, the built environment (i.e., space shuttle interiors) can be designed to provide 
tactile cues that can aid spatial orientation through stimulating cutaneous and vestibular 
receptors (Saradjian et al. 2014). I suggest here that somatic training – with its emphasis 
on increasing proprioceptive and interoceptive sensitivity, and improved kinaesthetic 
awareness – can potentially be of  tremendous benefit to astronauts.5 Another productive 
strategy might be to equip astronauts with other interfaces that afford (in the Gibsonian 
sense of  affordance; see Gibson 1979) increased proprioceptive awareness. 
Physiological empathy with animals
There has been an increasing interest in understanding the phenomenology of  non-
human animals (Martinelli 2010), particularly since a compelling case can be made for 
their sentience (Bekoff  and Goodall 2008). Indeed, the conveners of  the Cambridge 
Declaration on Consciousness are certain of  it (Low et al. 2012). Other than relying on 
objective measures and external descriptions of  cognitive activity – such as brain imaging
data representing neural activity in animals – how can we understand what animals might
be experiencing? I suggest that refined somatic capability in sensing subtle muscular and 
physiological activity can be combined with mental imagery to phenomenologically map 
animal affective experience into our own bodies. This phenomenological remapping is 
probably easier done the closer the animal is to humans, taxonomically and structurally. 
That is to say, an embodied imagining of  animal experience is feasible with a 
chimpanzee, less so with a dog, and significantly even less so with a starfish. While 
playing with a pet dog in the past and actively imagining what it might like to be in their 
body, for instance, I have personally experienced muscular sensations in the areas around 
my sacrum and coccyx (the tailbone) that seemed to me related to the experience of  
wagging a tail. 
Though I have suggested that human qualia is closer to some animal qualia than others, 
and that phenomenological distance is linked to taxonomical distance, I cannot discount 
the possibility that through somatic enquiry we might be able to sense vestiges of  
sensorial experiences of  invertebrates. As Grant (2014) suggests, perhaps there is a 
‘lingering presence or trace of  …  early sensory systems carried in our [own] nervous 
and sensory systems’.6
Conclusion: From within to between
In this article, I have described three scenarios wherein somatic study and practice is not 
typically applied but perhaps could be: working with non-western publics; dealing with 
the effects of  microgravity on the body; and empathizing with non-human animals. I 
have discussed these scenarios in increasing order of  speculation. The most speculative 
of  the three, the last scenario also has the most potential to transform our understanding
of  cognition and consciousness. 
These scenarios might appear to be very different from each other. But they are 
ultimately linked by a common theme: that there is a deep interconnectedness in all lived 
experience, and that these connections are likely inscribed in our sensory experience 
(Hackney 2004). Somatics, I propose, might offer approaches for discerning not just 
what is within but also what is between. It is through somatic methodologies’ deep and 
systematic application of  awareness to interoceptive, proprioceptive and kinaesthetic 
sensation that we might potentially come to understand these connections not just 
through externalized models and linguistic description, but also through felt experience. 
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Endnotes (next page)
1 Vocabularies for describing the inner landscape of  embodied experience are either imprecise, 
precariously narrow, or at odds with each other. This is to be expected; models – which vocabularies are
– necessarily simplify that which they represent, and this is no less true for models of  somatic 
knowledge. I take affect, feelings and emotions to be related but distinct (Shouse 2005).  In psychology, 
affect has been used in the past synonymously with ‘mood’, which, like the psychological definition of  
emotion, has an associated valence ranging from positive to negative, and is only partly characterized by
patterns of  physiological arousal (Bernstein 2006: 429). Other psychologists have distinguished affect 
from mood; whereas mood is ‘saturated in cognitions, especially evaluations’, affect is automatic, and 
can be ‘conscious or non-conscious’ (Baumeister et al. 2007). Above all, affect is a physiological 
experience: the heart rate quickening, the ‘thousands of  stimuli [that] impinge upon the human body’ 
but also the way in which the body’s way of  ‘infolding them all at once and registering them as an 
intensity’ (Shouse 2005). In his notes on his translation of  Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus, 
Brian Massumi offers an embodied definition – following Spinoza – of  affect; it is not ‘a personal 
feeling’ but rather ‘the passage from one experiential state of  the body to another and implying an 
augmentation or diminution in that body’s capacity to act’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: xvi). Affect is 
‘pre-reflective’ (Shear and Varela 1999: 135) and ‘precognitive’ (Thrift 2008).
2 An audio recording of  the exercise instructions is available on https://archive.org/details/speculative-
somatics. Borrowing from various somatic practices, particularly the Feldenkrais Method® (Feldenkrais
1990; Rywerant 2003) – this exercise is inspired by one given by Emilyn Claid at a keynote talk at the 
2015 Dance and Somatic Practices Conference in Coventry, UK. 
3 The term ‘somatic’ is used within other disciplines to signify different concepts. In biology, for 
instance, somatic is used to refer to particular cells and structures of  an organism; additionally, the 
somatic nervous system refers to the part of  the nervous system that is concerned with motor action. 
Neuroscientist Antonio Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis describes how emotion and affect 
influence cognitive processes (2004). Other uses of  the term abound. In this article, I use it exclusively 
to refer to the phenomenological study of  physiological experience. 
4 Embodied cognition is an approach to the study of  the mind that stands in contrast to positivist, 
disembodied and reductionist models of  human consciousness. Two types of  arguments are often 
advanced in the embodied cognition framework: the first is that the body shapes the mind (Gallagher 
2011); the second is that the material world shapes the mind (Ingold 2000; Malafouris 2013).
5 Ideas for how this might be possible could take inspiration from the case of  Ian Waterman (McNeill 
et al. 2010; BBC 1997). Mr Waterman lost all his proprioceptive abilities from the neck down, and 
successfully trained himself  to use his other senses – such as vision, equilibrioception (perception of  
balance), and thermoception (perception of  heat) – intensely as a way to replace his lost proprioception
and subsequently close the sensory-motor feedback loop. The closest that typically functioning humans
can experience to Mr Waterman’s loss of  experience is being in microgravity (BBC 1997).
6 Ventrella has opined on possible implications for our shared neurology with other mammals: 
If  we had tails, we’d be wagging them for our dogs when they are being good … It would not 
be easy to add a tail to the base of  a human spine and wire up the nerves and muscles. But if  it 
could be done, our brains would easily and happily adapt, employing some appropriate system 
of  neurons to the purpose of  wagging the tail—perhaps re-adapting a system of  neurons 
normally dedicated to doing ‘The Twist’. While it may not be easy to adapt our bodies to 
acquire such organs of  expression, our brains can easily adapt. (2014)
